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needed.
Many of
1983 are
seriously

The Monroe decision, while helpful, left much to be desired.
the objections expressed to police abuse litigation under section
of doubtful validity when viewed in the light that they are
impeding the application of a federal statutory remedy.

If federal protection of basic individual rights is desired, such protection may be implemented by giving an adequate remedial basis to section 1983. It is obvious however, that the implementation cannot be accomplished without a judicial expansion of the protective scope of the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, with a resulting subjection of state law enforcement to the restraints of federal power. The
fact that the courts are so often presented with the problem of making a
choice between inconsistent objects of desire does not present a cogent
excuse for their failure to develop adequate legal standards in the area
of section 1983 litigation.

TRANSFER OF CIVIL ACTIONS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
The Judicial Code Section 1404(a) provides, "For the convenience
of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might
have been brought."1 The purpose of this statute is to enable the trial
of an action to be held in the forum most convenient for all persons and
interests concerned, and the language of the statute clearly appears to
direct this result. In spite of the seemingly unambiguous language, the
attempt to interpret 1404(a) correctly has resulted in an astonishing bulk
of litigation. One of the most controversial problems arising under the
statute, the proper interpretation of the phrase "where it might have been
brought" has recently been resolved by the United States Supreme Court
in the case of Hoffman v. Blaski.2 Many problems however still remain
and demand solution.
In the Blaski case, the Supreme Court severely limited the scope of
1404(a) by holding that the statute presupposes two proper forums in
which the plaintiff can commence his action. The plaintiff began a patent infringement action in the District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, the place of the alleged infringement and thus the proper venue
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1950).

2. 363 U.S. 335 (1960).

NOTES
for the litigation,3 and served the defendant with process in that district. 4
The defendant moved under 1404(a) for transfer to the District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois on the grounds that the Illinois Court
would be more convenient for the parties and witnesses and in the interest
of justice. The defendant stated in the motion that he would waive all
objections to the venue of the Illinois District Court as a proper forum
and would enter his appearance in that court. Plaintiff objected on the
grounds that the transferee district was not one of proper venue nor one
in which the defendant was amenable to service of process, and therefore,
the Illinois Court was not one where the action "might have been
brought" as required by 1404(a). The Texas District Court granted
the motion to transfer, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
denied plaintiff's motion for leave to file a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the district judge to reverse the transfer order.' Judge
Hoffman of the Illinois District Court, to which the transfer was effected, subsequently denied plaintiff's motion to remand to the Texas
District Court. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit then
granted plaintiff's motion for a writ of mandamus directing Judge
Hoffman to reverse his order and remand the case to the Texas District
Court.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the defendant's petition.' In the principal case in an opinion by Mr. Justice Whittaker, the
Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's grant of mandamus and held that
a transfer under section 14 04(a) depends not on whether the defendant
is willing to waive his statutory defenses as to venue and jurisdiction over
his person, but rather, whether the transferee forum is one where originally venue was proper and where the defendant was amenable to service
of process. The Court recognized the general rule that venue and jurisdiction of the person are normally personal privileges of the defendant
which he may assert or waive at his option.' The Court, however, reasoned that the words "where it might have been brought" in 1404(a)
were unambiguous, expressing the Congressional intent that venue and
personal jurisdiction in the transferee forum must be proper on the
3. 28 U.S.C. 1400(b) (1950). "Any civil action for patent infringement may be
brought where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of
infringement and has a regular and established place of business."

4. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f). "All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere
within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held ..
5. Ex parte Blaski, 245 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1957).
6. Hoffman v. Blaski, 260 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1958).
7. Hoffman v. Blaski, 359 U.S. 904 (1959).
S. The general rule is that this personal privilege may be lost to the defendant by
failure to seasonably assert it, by formal submission in a cause, or by submission through
conduct, see Neirbo v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 308 U.S. 165 (1939) ; Commercial Casualty
Ins. Co. v. Consolidated Stone Co., 278 U.S. 177 (1928).
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original facts, and it is irrelevant that the defandant is willing to waive
these defenses and consent to trial in the transferee forum.' The Court
concluded that to allow the waiver rule to apply to 1404(a) cases would
result in gross discrimination against the plaintiff. The Court reasoned
that under the waiver rule a District Court, upon a finding of convenience, could grant the defendant's motion to transfer over the objection
of the plaintiff, to a district where the defendant was willing to waive
his defenses of venue and jurisdiction over his person. The plaintiff's
motion to transfer to an improper district, however, could never be
granted over the objection of the defendant. In short, the defendant's
venue-option should not be greater than the plaintiff's, and it would be if
the right of the defendant to waive venue or personal jurisdiction is relevant in determining where a civil action "might have been brought."1
In a dissent, Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out that under 1404(a) a
district judge is not authorized to transfer at the whim of the moving
party, but only when the "convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the
interest of justice" require. Therefore, any legitimate objection by the
plaintiff to defendant's motion to transfer (under the waiver theory)
would be reflected in a decision that the interest of justice does not require the transfer. Furthermore, 1404(a) operates to temper the inherent discrimination in our judicial system that results from the plaintiff's being given the sole choice of forums from among those where
service is possible and venue unobjectionable. The dissent concludes that
the holding of the majority greatly curtails the effectiveness of 1404(a)
because there are few cases in which there are alternative forums in which
venue is proper and where the defendant is amenable to service of process.
EvohtioM of 1404(a).

The enactment of 1404(a) was a result of

the revision of the Judicial Code begun in 1943 and completed in 1948.".
As indicated by the revisor's note, 1 1404(a) was based on the common
9. For authority that the phrase "where it might have been brought" in 1404(a)
was intended to mean a forum which was originally proper see Hobson, Forum Non
Conveniens Under the United States Judicial Code, 8 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 29 (1951);
Note, Curtailing the Scope of 1404(a)-Round Two, 60 YALE L.J. 183 (1951). For views
contrary to these see Note, 64 HARv. L.REV. 1347 (1951); Note, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 792,
796, "Waiver or consent by the defendant satisfies all the sensible requirements of the
statute and permits the judge in his discretion to find the convenient forum for the
court, the parties, and the witnesses."
10. For suggestions that if the waiver rule were made applicable to 1404(a) cases,
forum shopping by the defendant might thereby be encouraged see 57 MicH. L. REV.
772 (1959); 27 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 604 (1959).
11. See generally Hobson,supra note 9.
12. Revisory Committee note to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) "Subsection (a) was drafted
in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens, permitting transfer to a
more convenient forum, even though the venue is proper." For thorough discussions
of forum non conveniens see Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Convzeniens In Anglo-
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law doctrine of forum non conveniens which had been incorporated in
the federal law only the previous year in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert." Initially the courts held that 1404(a) was nothing more than a codification
of forum non conveniens,"' but gradually they began to attribute significant differences to the two doctrines; and it is now settled that 1404(a)
supplants forum non conveniens whenever the more convenient forum is
another federal court where the action "might have been brought."" A
district court may, however, still dismiss an action under forum non
conveniens when there is not a federal district court to which the action
can be transferred. 6 The remedy under forum non conveniens is dismissal of the action with the plaintiff instituting a new action in the more
convenient forum; x" the remedy under 1404(a) is a transfer of the action to the more convenient forum.' 8 The significance of this change is
that during the period between dismissal of the old case and commencement of a new action in a forum non conveniens case, the statute of limitations continues running while in a 1404(a) case, the original action is
retained and preserved from the running of the statute of limitations.
Secondly, forum non conveniens was not applicable to cases brought
under a statute which established a special venue," while the phrase "any
civil action" in 1404(a) rendered it applicable to such cases."0 Finally,
the discretion allowed the district court judge in considering transfer
motions is considerably broader under 1404(a) than it was under forum
non conveniens, and although the same factors are to be considered
under 1404(a) as under forum non conveniens, a transfer can be effected under 1404(a) on a lesser showing of inconvenience. 2 The most
significant similarity between forum non conveniens and 1404(a), as a
American Law, 29 COLUm. L. REv. 1 (1929); Brausher, The IiWonvenient Federal
Forum, 60 HARV. L. Rxv. 908 (1947).

13. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
14. Naughton v. Pennsylvania R.R., 85 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
15. Collins v. American Auto Ins. Co., 230 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1956), petition for
cert. dismissed, 352 U.S. 502 (1956). Accord, Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29

(1959).

16. Gross v. Owens, 221 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
17. Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
18. Ex parte Collette, 337 U.S. 55 (1948).
19. Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941) (FELA); Gulf Oil Co. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
20. Ex parte Collette, 337 U.S. 55 (1948) (FELA) ; United States v. National
City Lines, Inc., 337 U.S. 78 (1948) (antitrust laws). The issue of whether in rem
actions may be transferred under 1404(a) is still open, compare United States v. 23
Gross Jars, More or Less, of Enca Cream, 86 F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Ohio 1949) with
Torres v. Walsh, 221 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 836 (1955). However,
the difficulty is not whether in rem actions are civil actions, rather it is the inability
to find another forum where the action might have been brought.
21. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1954).
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result of the Blaski decision, is that both now presuppose at least two
forums in which a plaintiff can properly bring his action as a matter of
right; i.e., two forums in which venue and service of process are proper
on the facts without the necessity of the defendant waiving his objections to any defects in order to render a second forum proper.22
Motion To Transfer By The Plaintiff. Under forum non conveniens the remedy of dismissal is available only to the defendant because the purpose of the doctrine is to avoid harassment of the defendant
as a result of the plaintiff's commencement of the action in an inconvenient forum. 23 Barnhartv. John B. Rodgers Producing Co.2 4 has similarly held that a transfer under 1404(a) is not available to the plaintiff.
The theory of this court was that the purpose of the statute was to put
the defendant on a footing of equality with the plaintiff in the selection
of a forum for the place of trial and not to enlarge the plaintiff's rights.
This case has since been criticized, 2 and its reasoning repudiated by other
district courts holding that 1404(a) is not restricted by its terms to applications or transfers made by defendants, 26 and allowing transfers on
the motion of the plaintiff.27 In those instances in which the plaintiff's
motion to transfer was denied, the denial was based on grounds other
28
than that the motion was made by the plaintiff.
In a number of cases following the waiver theory and decided before the Blaski decision, transfer was allowed on the plaintiff's motion
to a forum which would not originally have been proper, when the de22. Compare Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), with Hoffman v. Blaski,
363 U.S. 335 (1960). But as pointed out in the dissent of Hoffman v. Blaski, supra,
there are a number of forum non conveniens cases where dismissals were granted only on
the condition that the defendant would submit to the jurisdiction of the more convenient
forum when it was not one available to the plaintiff over the defendant's objection.
23. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, supra note 22.
24. 86 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
25. Annot. 99 L. Ed. 799 at 813 (1954). The contention is that the word "parties"
in 1404(a) should not be limited to party or parties defendant, but was also intended to
include party or parties plaintiff.
26. Thompson Prod. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 127 F. Supp. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1955);
Dufex v. Roux Distrib. Co., 125 F.Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
27. See Dufex v. Roux Distrib. Co., supra note 26; Troy v. Poorvu, 132 F. Supp.
864 (D. Mass. 1955) ; Otto v. Hirl, 89 F. Supp. 72 (S.D. Iowa 1950) ; Torres v. Walsh,
221 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 836 (1955); Great No. Ry. v. Hyde,
245 F.2d 537 (8th Cir. 1957).
28. See Bolten v. General Motors Corp., 81 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Ill. 1949), rez'd
on other grounds, 180 F.2d 379 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 813 (1950), where plaintiff's motion was denied when he sought transfer in order to avoid the statute of
limitations in the transferor district. Accord, Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 185 F.2d
777 (9th Cir. 1950), where plaintiff's motion was denied because defendant was not
originally amenable to service of process in the transferee district.
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fendant consented to trial there." In one case, transfer was allowed on
the plaintiff's motion over the objection of the defendant to a forum in
which defendant was not presently nor had ever been amenable to service
of process, on the theory that the phrase "where it might have been
brought" referred only to venue and subject matter jurisdiction." Conversely, many of the lower federal courts have denied a plaintiff's motion
to transfer to an originally improper forum when the defendant objects,
reasoning that the words "where it might have been brought" include
amenability to service of process and venue, which the defendant is entitled to assert in opposition to the motion.3 The effect of the Blaski decision in situations in which a plaintiff moves for transfer to an originally improper forum is to render either the defendant's consent or his
objection to the motion irrelevant because the trial judge no longer has
the power to effect such a transfer and the defendant's waiver of defects
in the transferee forum can no longer give rise to such power.
A more difficult case may arise when the plaintiff moves for transfer to a forum which is presently improper although at the time of the
commencement of the action it was a forum where the action "might
have been brought," e.g., when the defendant is not presently amenable
to service of process in the transferee district although initially he was."2
It seems the Blaski decision would allow a transfer on these facts because
it is material only that the transferee forum be proper at the time of
commencement of the action and not at the time of the motion for
transfer.
The Blaski decision involved only a motion to transfer made by the
defendant. The case, therefore, is not authority for the proposition that
a transfer under 1404(a) is not available to the plaintiff. In future
cases when the transferee forum is proper as required by the Blaski decision, i.e., where it is one where the action "might have been brought,"
and a transfer would be "for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice," a transfer could be permitted on a motion made by the plaintiff. As a result of the Blacski ruling, however, the
plaintiff's motion to transfer should be scrutinized more closely than the
29. Torres v. Walsh, 221 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 836 (1955).
In denying defendant's petition for a writ of mandamus the Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit said at p. 321 ". . . as the respondent claimant has agreed voluntarily
to appear in the action in the District Court of Puerto Rico, there appears to be no
difficulty on the scope of venue. .. ."
30. Troy v. Poorvu, 132 F. Supp. 864 (D. Mass. 1955).
31. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1950). Accord, Shapiro
v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 185 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1950).

32. For a case where plaintiff's motion to transfer was granted on these facts

see Otto v. Harl, 89 F. Supp. 72 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
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defendant's motion."
The question naturally arises, if the proposed
transferee forum is allegedly more convenient, why did the plaintiff not
initially commence his action there? In other words, it must be assured
that 1404(a) does not become a tactic by which a plaintiff could harass
a defendant by initially commencing his action in an inconvenient forum
and then moving for a transfer to the more convenient forum.
Motion To Transfer By The Defendant. As was already noted, several cases before the Blaski decision adopted the position that the defendant, in moving for transfer under 1404(a) to a forum which was originally improper, had formally waived his statutory defenses relating to
venue and service of process and had consented to trial in the transferee
forum. In these cases it was reasoned that the phrase "where it might
have been brought' in 140 4 (a) could be read "where it could now be
brought" as a result of the defendant's waiver of venue and personal
jurisdiction defects in the transferee forum.34 Other lower federal
courts, however, refused to apply the "waiver" theory, holding that the
transferee forum must have been originally proper on the facts. Under
this approach, as affirmed by the Blaski case, the phrase "where it might
have been brought" is a limitation on the power of the trial judge prohibiting transfer to an originally improper forum, and it is not a permissible exercise of the court's discretion to transfer to such a forum.3" In
these decisions rejecting the waiver theory, the courts have relied on the
fact that under forum non conveniens there need be two proper forums
in which a plaintiff can bring his action;36 and, since 1404(a) is based
on forum non conveniens, it too must require two proper forums. But
the reason two proper forums were required under forum non conveniens was that, since the remedy was dismissal, there should be another forum in which the plaintiff could commence a new action. Under
1404(a), however, where the remedy is transfer, there seems to be no
logical reason for requiring that there be a transferee forum originally
33.

Cf. Bolten v. General Motors Corp., 81 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Ill. 1949), rcv'd

on other grounds, 180 F.2d 379, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 813 (1950) ; Dancsecz v. CarnegieIll. Steel Corp., 98 F. Supp. 612 (W.D. Pa. 1951).

34. Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Rodney, 186 F.2d 111, 114 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,

340 U.S. 953 (1950).

"The difference between the phrase 'might have been brought'

of section 1404(a) and that employed in this opinion, 'could now be brought' is no
more than one of tense and grammar, the imperfect subjunctive as compared to the
pluperfect subjunctive. Surely Congress did not intend the effect of an important
remedial statute to turn upon tense or a rule of grammar." Accord, In re Josephson,

218 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1954) ; Anthony v. Kaufman, 193 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 955 (1952).

35. See General Electric Co. v. Central Transit Warehouse Co., 127 F. Supp. 817
(W.D. Mo. 1955) ; United States v. 23 Gross Jars, More or Less, of Enca Cream, 86
F. Supp. 824 (N.D. Ohio 1949).

36. Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co., 77 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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proper when the defendant is willing to waive any defects in an improper
forum.
An even more difficult situation occurs when there are multi-party
defendants and the proposed transferee is proper as to some, i.e., a forum
where the action "might have been brought," and improper as to the
others. In cases decided before the Blaski decision by courts adhering to
the waiver rule, transfer was allowed to the improper forum when all the
defendants consented." It goes without saying that such a decision is no
longer pennissible as a result of the Blaski decision. The situation is
further complicated, however, if some of the defendants are indispensable
parties and the others only permissive parties.88 Where the transferee
forum was not one where the action "might have been brought" as to the
indispensable parties, earlier cases, not following the "waiver" rule, denied the transfer;39 and this probably will be the result in future cases as
a consequence of the Blaski decision. But if the transferee forum is one
where the action "might have been brought" as to the indispensable party
defendants and improper only as to the permissive parties, it does not
seem that the Blaski rule must necessarily prohibit transfer. Rather,
when a transfer of the action as it involves the indispensable parties
would be "for the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice" it might be ordered; and under Rule 20(b)4" the court
could sever the permissive parties for whom the transferee forum was
improper. Rule 19(b) 4 would then permit the transferee court to proceed with the action without the permissive party defendants.
37. See Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Rodney, 186 F.2d 111 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,

340 U.S. 953 (1950), where transfer was allowed on the motion of the defendant although
venue in the transferee district was proper as to only nine of the fifteen defendants.
Accord, Anthony v. Kaufman, 193 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
955 (1952) where a transfer was granted although only one of the defendants could be
served with process in the transferee district but the other defendants joined in the
motion to transfer.
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a). "Subject to the provisions of Rule 23 and of subdivision (b) of this rule, persons having a joint interest shall be made parties and be
joined on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants. When a person who should join

as a plaintiff refuses to do so, he may be made a defendant or, in proper cases, an
involuntary plaintiff."
39. General Electric Co. v. Central Transit Warehouse Co., 127 F. Supp. 817
(W.D. Mo. 1955). Accord, Blacknair v. Guerre, 190 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1951).

40. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(b). "The court may make such orders as will prevent a

party from being embarassed, delayed, or put to expense by the inclusion of a party
against whom he asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against him, and may order

separate trials or make other orders to prevent delay or prejudice." (Emphasis added.)
41. Fa. R. Civ. P. 19(b). "The court in its discretion may proceed in the action
without making such persons parties, if its jurisdiction over them as to either service
of process or venue can be acquired only by their consent or voluntary appearance or if,

though they are subject to its jurisdiction, their joinder would deprive the court of
jurisdiction of the parties before it. ... "
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FactorsAffecting Discretion On Motions To Transfer. The Blaski
case does not add to or subtract from any of the factors the trial judge
may weigh in determining if a transfer would be "for the convenience of
the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice." The case does, however, limit the number of instances in which an exercise of judicial discretion is appropriate by interpreting the phrase where it "might have
been brought" as a limitation on the power to transfer rather than as an
element of discretion. The procedure in ruling on motions to transfer
under 1404(a) is also considerably altered by the Blaski decision. The
trial judge now must first determine whether the proposed transferee
forum is one where the action "might have been brought." If it is not
such a forum, the trial judge lacks the power to order the transfer, and
therefore, no hearing or decision on the merits of the transfer is necessary. It becomes irrelevant how much more convenient the transferee
forum may be than the transferor forum if the former was not originally
proper. This alteration in procedure is illustrated in Ragsdale v. Price,"
one of the first 1404(a) cases to be decided after the Blaski case, in which
the judge conceded that the transferee forum appeared to be more convenient but denied the transfer because that forum was not one where
the action "might have been brought."
Once it has been established that the transferee forum conforms to
the Blaski rule, the trial judge has the power to transfer at his discretion;
and he then proceeds to a consideration of the merits of the transfer.4 3
The district courts originally held that the factors44 to be considered and
the degree of discretion allowed the trial judge under 140 4 (a) were the
same as those under forum non conveniens, 3 but it is now settled that
the discretion to be exercised under 1404(a) is broader than it was
under forum non conveniens.4" There are three criteria set out in 1404(a)
which the trial judge is to apply in ruling on transfer motions: the con42. 185 F. Supp. 263 (M.D. Tenn. 1960).
43. For thorough discussions of the factors considered in ruling on a motion to
transfer under 1404(a) see generally, Brown, Factors To Be Considered In Determining
A Motion To Transfer Under 28 U.S.C. 14o4(a), 26 INs. COUNSEL J. (1959) ; Annot.,
5 A.L.R.2d 1239 (1949) ; Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 932 (1950).
44. Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), established the six following
factors to be considered in ruling on a motion to dismiss under the doctrine of forum
non conveniens: (1) Relative ease of access to sources of proof. (2) Availability of
compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses, and the cost of obtaining
willing witnesses. (3) Possibility of view of the premises if view would be appropriate
to the action. (4) All other practical problems that make trial of the case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. (5) Questions of enforceability of judgement if one is
obtained. (6) Relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial.
45. Richer v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 80 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Mo. 1948) ; Hayes v.
Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 79 F Supp. 821 (D.Minn. 1948).
46. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1954).
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venience of the parties, the convenience of the witnesses and the interest
of justice."7 It is reversible error to order a transfer on the basis of criteria other than these three enumerated in the statute,4" and the burden
is on the moving party to make out a strong case for transfer.4 9
Under the criterion "the convenience of the parties" the courts have
considered some of the following as factors: the additional expense to
the movant from trying the case in the transferor rather than the transferee forum,"0 the adverse effects on the movant's business if transfer
were denied,"' the extra burden put on the movant's impaired health by
traveling to the transferor forum in order to attend the trial, " the burden
of moving voluminous records of an evidentiary nature from the movant's office in the transferee district to the transferor district if the motion to transfer were denied, 3 and innumerable other factors that would
add to the convenience of the parties if a transfer were granted.
Originally in applying the criterion, "convenience of the witnesses"
the district courts appeared merely to have totaled up the number of witnesses each party intended to call, and if the number of witnesses the
movant intended to call was the greater, the motion was granted; if it
was the smaller, the motion was denied. "4 Later the courts adopted the
more realistic position that it is the relative importance of the individual
witnesses rather than the total number that each party intends to call that
is decisive. " The fact that witnesses whom the movant intends to call
are not subject to subpoena by the transferor court but are by the transferee court is a factor to be considered. " The distance the witnesses
47. Cinema Amusements, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 319, 327, (D. Del. 1949),
. in interest of justice is a reason not only separate and distinct from convenience
of parties and witnesses, but a necessary resultant factor from such convenience."
48. Wiren v. Laws, 194 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
49. Spence v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 89 F. Supp. 823 (N.D. Ohio 1950); Brown v.
Insurograph, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del. 1949).
50. See, e.g., Nunn v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 80 F. Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y.
1948), where transfer was granted where the movant would otherwise have to bring
from Iowa to New York (1200 miles) eight of his key employees as witnesses at a cost
of $4,000-$5,000 or five times as much as if the trial were held in the transferor district.
51. See, e.g., Nunn v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., supra note 50; Cinema
Amusements, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 319 (D. Del. 1949); United States v.
E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., 83 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1949).
52. See Troy v. Poorvu, 132 F. Supp. 864 (D. Mass. 1955).
53. See United States v. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., 83 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C.
1949) ; Cinema Amusements, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 319 (D. Del. 1949).
54. See Cinema Amusements, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., supra note 53.
55. See Ultra Sucro Co. v. Illinois Water Treatment Co., 146 F. Supp. 393, 398
(S.D.N.Y. 1956), "Since parties tend to outdo each other in the sum total of possible
witnesses they can locate in or near the district in which each would like to try the
case, the judge must endeavor to determine who the key witnesses are rather than merely
count up possible witnesses for each side." Accord, Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d
329 (2d Cir. 1950).
56. See Henderson v. American Airlines, 91 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
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would be required to travel and the resulting cost, when there is a proper
forum at closer proximity to the movant's place of residence, is a determining factor ;" but, in considering this factor, it may also be taken into
account that modern transportation facilities make distance seem much
shorter."8 The fact that the witnesses are engaged in a business which
requires that they not be at any great distance from their places of residence for any appreciable length of time may be considered."5 It may
weigh against the granting of the motion, however, if the witnesses are
employees of the moving party and there presumably would be no difficulty in securing their appearance."0 Finally, the residence of expert witnesses is not considered of great importance in ruling on transfer
motions."'
The criterion "in the interest of justice" gives the trial judge wide
discretion to consider other factors which may be conducive to a convenient place for trial but which are not included in the criteria for the
convenience of the parties and witnesses. A few specific examples may
be given of factors which have been considered under this criterion. The
relative possibility of obtaining a fair trial in the two forums because of
local prejudice is an influencing factor.62 The fact that the court calendar in the transferee district is less crowded than the calendar of the
transferor forum is a slight factor to be considered."3 When a view of
the locus in quo by the jury would be of importance in trying the case,
that factor will be considered by the court. 4 The possibility that the
counsel of either party might be inconvenienced as a result of a ruling on
57. See Hayes v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 79 F. Supp. 821 (D. Minn. 1948). Accord,
Otto v. Hirl, 89 Supp. 72 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
58. See United States v. Scott & Williams, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
59. See Otto v. Hirl, 89 F. Supp. 72 (S.D. Iowa 1950), where plaintiff's motion
to transfer was granted where otherwise his witnesses, tvo of whom were policemen
and four of whom were doctors, would be compelled to travel 240 miles.
60. See Cullenan v. New York Cent. R.R., 83 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1948),
where defendant's motion to transfer from the southern district to the western district
of New York was denied since fifteen of his witnesses were also his employees and
there presumably would be no difficulty in securing their appearance.
61. See Magnetic Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir. 1950). The rationale for this rule apparently being that expert witnesses are
selected because of their reputation and special knowledge and without regard to their
residence, and they are well compensated for their inconvenience.
62. See Wilson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 156 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Mo. 1957),
where defendant's motion for transfer was denied although he and his witnesses would
be inconvenienced, when the negro plaintiff demonstrated that because of racial prejudice
in the geographic area of the transferee district it appeared unlikely that he could get
an impartial jury.
63. See, e.g., Wilson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., supra note 62; Magnetic
Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1950) ; United States
v. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., 83 F. Supp. 233 (D.D.C. 1949).
64. See Southern Ry. v. Madden, 235 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1956).

NOTES
a motion to transfer is immaterial."

The timeliness of the motion to

transfer may be considered if it will further delay the trial, and apparently a motion, to be timely, must be made before there is a joinder of
issues." The plaintiff initially has the right to choose his forum, and to
have this choice overturned the defendant must show a substantial inconvenience in the transferor forum and not simply that he desires a
transfer."7 On the other hand, plaintiff's motion to transfer may be denied when it appears that he seeks such a transfer because of some present defect in the transferor forum which would be cured if the transfer
were granted.0
The point last mentioned raises the problem of whether the substantive law of the transferor or transferee state is applicable after transfer of a case based on diversity of citizenship.63 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 0
requires a federal court in diversity cases to apply the substantive law of
the state in which it sits, and Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. M:fg. Co."' extended
the Erie rule to require federal courts to follow the conflict of laws rule
of the state in which it sits. These rules appear to direct that subsequent
to transfer under 1404(a), the substantive law and conflict of laws rule
of the transferee state is to be applied. Most cases dealing with this
problem have been concerned with the appropriate statute of limitations.
Some courts have tacitly assumed that the statute of limitations of the
transferee forum would govern,7 " while others have expressly stated that
it would govern and granted a transfer only on the condition that the
defendant would waive his right to assert the statute of limitations of
the transferee forum as a bar to the action.
On the other hand, in
Headrick v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. 4 it was held that after transfer the
statute of limitations of the transferor forum continued to control. The
65.

See, e.g., Wilson v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 156 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Mo.

1957); Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1955).

66. See Brainard v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 81 F. Supp. 211 (N.D. Ill.
1948).
67. Brown v. Insurograph, Inc., 85 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del. 1949); Norwood v.
Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1954).
68. Bolten v. General Motors Corp., 81 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Ill. 1949), reefd. on
other grounds, 180 F.2d 379 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 813 (1950). Plaintiff's
motion denied when he sought transfer to a district which had a five year statute of
limitations for personal injury cases after defendant had interposed the two year
statute of limitations of the transferor district as a bar to the action.
69. For a thorough discussion of this area see Currie, The Erie Doctrine and
Transfer of Civil Actions, 17 F.R.D. 353 (1955).

70. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
71. 313 U.S. 487 (1940).
72. Bolten v. General Motors Corp., 81 F. Supp. 851 (N.D. Ill. 1949), rev'd on other

grounds, 180 F.2d 379 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 813 (1950).
73. Frechoux v. Lykes Bros., 118 F. Supp. 234 (1953); Curry v. States Marine
Corp., 118 F. Supp. 234 (1953).
74. 182 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1950).
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reasoning of the court was that since the original action is retained after
transfer under 1404(a), the case remains a transferor forum case and as
such is controlled by the conflict of laws rule of the
transferor state.
If the Erie and Klaxon doctrines demand that the substantive law
and choice of law rules of either the transferor or transferee forum be
consistently applied, the result reached in the Headrick case is the preferable alternative. To require that the law of the transferee forum be
always applicable would tend to encourage a litigant to seek out an alternative forum where the law was more favorable to him and move to
transfer the action there. Such a result would convert 1404(a) into an
objectionable forum shopping device. The result in the Headrick case,
however, is also open to objection. That decision allows the plaintiff to
initially choose a forum where, although inconvenient as to the parties
and witnesses, the law is most favorable to his cause of action, and subsequently move for transfer to the convenient forum. Of course the
transfer might be denied on the ground that it was not in the interest of
justice, but this would result in the trial being conducted in an inconvenient forum, contrary to the purpose of 1404(a). The over-all philosophy of the Blaski decision of equating the venue option of the plaintiff and defendant suggests a possible solution to this dilemma. It would
be more in accord with the spirit of 1404(a) to allow the judge ruling
on a motion to transfer, to designate at his discretion whether the substantive law and choice of law rules of the transferor or transferee forum
would be applicable in order that the transfer might be in the interest of
justice. In this way the criteria of "convenience of parties and witnesses"
would not be subverted to the criterion "in the interest of justice." For
example, if a transfer would be for the convenience of the parties and
witnesses but would also result in the moving party getting a bonus because of a more favorable conflict of laws rule in the transferee forum,
it could be ordered that the conflict of laws rule of the transferor forum
would control. Similarly, if the transferee forum were more convenient
and it was apparent that the plaintiff had begun his action in the transferor forum to gain the benefit of a favorable conflicts rule, the transfer
motion would be granted with the order that the conflicts rule of the
transferee forum would govern. This solution would avoid the mechanical and often unjust aspects of consistently applying the law of one of
the forums and would add to the flexibility which is an integral part of
1404(a). Permitting the federal court of the transferee state to apply
the law of the transferor would not be seriously objectionable on the basis of either the Erie or Klaron rules. Both of these decisions were
rendered prior to the enactment of 1404(a), thus the problem here in-
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volved was not forseeable. These decisions require substantive conformity between decisions of the federal court and the courts of the state
in which it sits, but this requirement does not seem to demand that there
be conformity between the decisions of the federal court and the courts
of the transferee state if conformity exists between the federal courts and
the courts of the state where the action was originally commenced.
Review of Transfer Orders. The Courts of Appeal are in complete
agreement that 1404(a) orders are only interlocutory and not immediately appealable as a matter of right." Thus, any immediate review of
1404(a) orders must come by way of the extraordinary legal remedies
of writs of mandamus or prohibition." When there has been an immediate attempt to appeal a 1404(a) order, the procedure has been to treat
it as a petition for a writ of mandamus.77 The Courts of Appeal are in
hopeless disagreement, however, concerning the extent to which mandamus and prohibition may be used as a device for immediate review of
1404(a) orders.7 ' There appear to be at least four distinct positions the
courts have taken on the availability of the extraordinary writs in
1404(a) cases: (1) Mandamus or prohibition is a proper means of reviewing any 1404(a) order because otherwise there is no plausible means
by which the parties can obtain meaningful review. The theory of this
position is that once there has been a trial on the merits any ruling made
on a 1404(a) motion has become moot because the purpose of the statute,
transfer of the action to a more convenient forum, can no longer be
achieved. 71 (2) Mandamus or prohibition is available in "really extraordinary cases" as a means by which a Court of Appeals can protect its
potential appellate jurisdiction, even against another Court of Appeals.
Under this position a writ of mandamus or prohibition will never issue to
review a denial of a 1404(a) motion or the granting of a motion to
75. It re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1954) ; Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Igoe,
220 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1955) ; Carr v. Donohoe, 201 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1953) ; Nicol v.
Koscinski, 18 F.2d 537 (6th Cir. 1951) ; Magnetic Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings. Mfg.
Co., 178 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Shapiro v. Bonanza Hotel Co., 185 F.2d 777 (9th Cir.
1950) ; Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart Warner Co., 177 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1949).
76. The Courts of Appeal derive their power to issue writs of mandamus or
prohibition in 1404(a) cases from the "All Writs" act: 28 U.S.C. 1651 (a) "The Supreme
Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to usages and
principles of law."
77. See, e.g., Arrowhead Co. v. The Aimee Lykes, 193 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1951).
78. For complete discussions of the reviewability of 1404(a) orders see, Note,
Appealability of 1404(a) Orders: Mandamus Misapplied, 67 YALE L.J. 122 (1957);
Comment, Review of Section i4o4(a) Federal Venue Proceedings by Extraordinary Writ,
43 CALIF. L. REv. 841 (1955); Kaufman, Further Observations On Transfer Under
Seetion 1404(a), 56 CoLum. L. REv. 1 (1956).

79. See Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan, 182 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Magnetic Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1950).
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transfer to a district within that circuit because there is no impairment of
appellate jurisdiction."0 (3) Mandamus or prohibition is proper to review and correct an abuse of discretion by the trial judge or to order him
to exercise his discretion under 1404(a) when he has improperly refused
to do so.81 (4) Mandamus or prohibition is proper in cases in which the
trial judge exceeds his power to transfer, 2 e.g., orders transfer to a district court which was one not originally proper, or when he applies criteria other than those contained in the statute in considering a transfer
motion."8
The opinion in the Blaski case, far from settling the controversy
over the scope of immediate reviewability of 1404(a) orders by use of
the extraordinary writs, appears to add more confusion to this area. In
the Blaski case the specific issue presented to the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit by plaintiff's motion for leave to file a petition for a
writ of mandamus was the power of the district judge to order a transfer
to the Illinois District Court, and by denying the motion the court affirmed such power in that court. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit was, in effect, presented with exactly the same issue by the plaintiff's petition for a writ of mandamus to order Judge Hoffman to remand the case to the transferor court,8" and by granting the writ the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied the power of the transferor court to order the transfer. Thus, until the ruling by the Supreme
Court determining the proper forum, the parties were in a state of limbo
with the Fifth Circuit contending the Illinois District Court was the
proper forum and the Seventh Circuit contending the Texas District Court
was proper. By approving of this double review by way of petitions for
80. It re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1954) ; Carr v. Donohoe, 201 F.2d 426
(8th Cir. 1953). Contra, Magnetic Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., supro
note 79; Torres v. Walsh, 221 F.2d 319 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 836 (1955).
81. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1955); Sypert v. Miner,
266 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Lemon v. Druffel, 253 F.2d 680 (6th Cir. 1958) ; Jiffy
Lubricator Co. v. Stewart Warner Corp., 177 F.2d 360 (4th Cir. 1949). Contra, All
States Freight v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010 (3rd Cir. 1952) ; Anthony v. Kaufman, 193
F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 955 (1952) ; Paramount Pictures, Inc. v.
Rodney, 186 F.2d 111 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 953 (1950).
82. Anthony v. Kaufman, supra note 81; Foster-Milburn Co. v. Knight, 181 F.2d
949 (2d Cir. 1950).
83. Wiern v. Laws, 194 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
84. Prior to the Blaski decision there was little authority concerning the power
of a district court to remand a case which it had received as a result of a transfer under
1404(a). Compare Fettig Canning Co. v. Steckler, 188 F.2d 715 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
341 U.S. 951 (1951), where the order of the transfering judge remanding the case was
affirmed on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the transferee court,
with Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Davis, 185 F.2d 766 (5th Cir. 1950), where it was held
that a transferee court may not order a case remanded when this amounts to a renunciation of jurisdiction which the court is legally bound to exercise.
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writs of mandamus, the Supreme Court seems to have laid the groundwork
for much difficulty and confusion in future cases concerning the reviewability of 1404(a) orders by means of the extraordinary writs. For example, in a situation where both the transferor and transferee Courts of
Appeal allow review of transfer orders by mandamus in order to correct
an abuse of discretion by the trial judge, the transferor Court of Appeals
might find no such abuse and affirm the transfer order, only to have the
transferee Court of Appeals hold that there was an abuse of discretion
and order the case to be remanded. Conceding that there is great utility
in judicial flexibility, it would seem to be desirable for the Supreme
Court to finally determine the general scope of the extraordinary writs
as a method for immediate review of 1404(a) orders, and to apply the
principles of estoppel to decisions rendered by a Court of Appeals on petitions for mandamus and prohibtion. That is, once the appellant's petition for an extraordinary writ has been denied by the transferor Court of
Appeals he should then be estopped from raising the issue of the correctness of the ruling on the motion to transfer by means of a petition for
an extraordinary writ to the transferee Court of Appeals. This procedure would more nearly insure an expeditious trial which was one of
the contemplated objectives of 1404(a).
CONCLUSION

The Blaski case curtails much of the expected effectiveness of
1404(a) by severely restricting its scope. Particularly in cases based on
diversity of citiznship between natural persons the possibility of a transfer under 1404(a) becomes nearly nonexistent because there are rarely
two federal forums in which the defendant was originally amenable to
service of process and where venue was proper. The convenience to be
gained from a proposed transfer, the primary objective of 1404(a), becomes a serious consideration only after it has been determined that the
transferee forum was one in which the plaintiff could originally have
properly brought his action. In short, the power to transfer takes precedence over the convenience to be gained by a transfer. It now appears
that the only way in which 1404(a) can become an effective means of
lessening the burden of an inconvenient forum is by Congressional deletion of the phrase "where it might have been brought." In addition, the
Blaski decision, by apparently affirming the practice used by the defendant in the case in securing immediate review of the transfer order by
petition for a writ of mandamus in both the Courts of Appeal for the
transferor and transferee circuits, greatly adds to the confusion already
present in this area.

